Public debt sustainability. An empirical study on OECD countries by Beqiraj, Elton et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Macroeconomics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jmacro
Public debt sustainability: An empirical study on OECD countries
Elton Beqiraj, Silvia Fedeli⁎, Francesco Forte
Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9, Rome 00161, Italy











A B S T R A C T
For a panel of 21 OECD heterogeneous countries from 1991 to 2015, we study governments’
reactions to the accumulation of debt and look at whether governments voluntary take corrective
measures when the debt-GDP ratio starts rising or they rather let the debt grow. We distinguish
between discretionary and automatic response of primary balance of government actions, as
captured by the structural component of public primary balance and by cyclical component of
public primary balance. We show the existence of a systematic long-term relationship between
debt and structural primary balance supporting the view that the long-term governments’ dis-
cretionary response to increases in the debt-GDP ratio is negative, that is, governments are not
currently taking long-term actions that counteract the increases in debts and do not satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint. In the short term, an asymmetric fiscal policy response ex-
ploiting the output gap, by part of the political class of the countries considered, seems to emerge:
it intervenes with a new deficit and debt when the output gap is positive, but it does not adopt a
symmetrical correction when the situation is reversed.
1. Introduction
In the wake of the recent global recession, given the worrying increase of public debt in the OECD economies, there has been a
renewed twofold interest in governments’ reaction to the debt accumulation dynamics. On the one hand, several theoretical and
empirical papers (Bohn, 1995, 1998; Fincke and Greiner, 2012, and Greiner et al., 2007) have tried to provide support for both the
existence and the sign and size of this reaction. On the other hand, the nature of governments’ reactions to the accumulation of debt
in terms of sustainability has become of paramount importance.
This issue has received considerable attention also at a policy level debate both in Europe, since the early 1990s with the
Maastricht Treaty, and in the United States, mainly after the financial and economic crisis that began in the second half of 2007 and
then spread to the entire world economy. In particular, in Europe, a persistent and solid growth of the public debt for some countries
has been a common phenomenon often joint with an average low GDP growth since the early 1970s. The last financial and economic
crisis created an environment characterized by a general concern for the public debt crisis that left several EU members (for example,
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus) unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks
under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties. Europe reacted in 2012 with the “Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,” whereby the EU member states agreed to bind themselves to
several balanced budget rules.
In this paper, we study the governments’ reactions to the accumulation of debt and look at whether governments take corrective
measures when the debt-GDP ratio starts rising, or they let the debt grow, with important and well-known consequences for public
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debt (non)sustainability. With this purpose, for a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1991 to 2015 we investigate on the existence of a
systematic relationship between debt and primary balance series.
This agenda raises questions regarding both the time series properties of the relevant variables and the critical assumption about
the more likely relevant variables and determinants. Moreover, it requires to take into consideration the fact that unobserved factors
affecting directly or indirectly governments’ choice cause a heterogeneous response to the common shocks, even if the developed
economies considered tend to share a common environment. We afford these issues by referring to the second-generation panel
cointegration tests, which accounts for cross section dependence (Westerlund, 2007; Westerlund and Prohl, 2010; Mahdavi and
Westerlund, 2011). Such tests allow for disentangling the crucial features of the relevant variables also taking into consideration the
issue of cross-section dependence in the data.
The main novelty of the paper, however, is that unlike most of the traditional literature on this issue (Bohn, 1998, 2005; Mauro
et al., 2015; Ghosh et al., 2013b; Weichenrieder and Zimmer, 2015; Fournier and Fall, 2015; Fincke and Greiner, 2011; 2012, and
Greiner and Fincke, 2016), following Gali et al. (2003), we distinguish between discretionary and automatic response of primary
balance of government actions, defined as “active” and “passive” fiscal policies. The former are captured quantitatively by the
structural component of public primary balance, i.e. that part of primary surplus or deficit which is not influenced by the economic
cycle and, therefore, better identify the nature of fiscal policy actions and intentions. The “passive” or automatic fiscal policies are,
instead, quantitatively better captured by the nonstructural/cyclical component of public primary balance, which identifies the
consequences of business cycle fluctuations and non-ordinary events of the economic activity. In order to avoid heteroscedasticity
problems due to likely non-linearities of the fiscal policies, we refer our variables to potential output. As suggested by
Giavazzi et al. (2000), dividing by actual rather than potential output would introduce a likely endogeneity bias due to the corre-
lation between the error term and the right-hand side variables. If both debt and structural primary balance are both nonstationary
and cointegrated - while both other likely determinants of primary balance and the error term are stationary -, we can directly test
whether the measures taken by government are corrective or rather let the debt grow, without modelling explicitly the process
related to stationary variables.
Even in presence of cross-section dependence in the data, due to heterogeneous socio-economic structure of the different
economies – as mentioned, our empirical setup allows for slope heterogeneity across panel units in a nonstationary panel model - we
show that a cointegrated univariate regression of structural primary balance on debt is significantly supported by the data. In other
words, in the presence of cointegration between the two variables, even in the absence of a fully articulated equation for primary
surpluses – that, among others, Bohn (1998), Fincke and Greiner (2012), and Greiner et al. (2007) had to motivate by Barro's (1979)
tax-smoothing model1 -, there is a significant conditional impact of debt on structural primary balance. We also show that the long-
term response of the structural primary balance to changes in the debt-GDP ratio is negative, that is, governments are not currently
taking long-term actions that counteract the increases in debts. As a consequence (see below Section 3), government policy is not
sustainable in the sense of Bohn (1995, 1998, 2005).
This has been a controversial issue. Bohn (1998) shows that U.S. fiscal policy has historically been sustainable despite extended
periods of primary deficits.2 Referring to US data, he argues that the primary balance and the debt-GDP ratio do not have unit roots.
Therefore, omitting other determinants of the primary surplus in his setup produces inconsistent estimates due to omitted variables
bias. Because of the potential omitted variables problems, Bohn (1998) needed to base the empirical analysis on an explicit theo-
retical model of fiscal policy (i.e., Barro, 1979).3 For OECD data, we find significant evidence that structural primary balance and the
debt-GDP ratio do have unit roots and that the structural primary balance is a cointegrating and decreasing function of the debt, both
taken as a ratio of potential GDP, for the 21 OECD economies considered from 1991 to 2015. Given the estimated long-term negative
response of the structural primary balance to the debt, the government budget identity implies that the debt-potential GDP ratio
should not be mean-reverting and therefore not sustainable in the sense of Bohn (1995, 1998).4
The principal feature of cointegrated variables is their responsiveness to any deviation from the long-run equilibrium. This asks
for an error correction model, in which the short-term dynamics of the variables in the system are influenced by the deviation from
1 Barro (1979) found a positive effect of temporary increases in government spending on debt, a counter-cyclical response on public debt to a
temporary GDP variation and a one-to-one effect of expected inflation on nominal debt growth rate. Barro (1986a, 1986b), based on the estimated
tax smoothing model for the US economy, provides statistical evidence that a shift toward a fiscal policy that generates either more real public debt
on average or larger deficit response to recession is not supported by the empirical evidence, suggesting that the higher values of the deficits
registered are a result of the response to substantial recession and expected inflation.
2 More recently, however, Ghosh et al. (2013b) extending Bohn's “weak sustainability criterion” develop a measure of maximum debt that
depends both on a country's 'fiscal response function' - how strongly its primary surplus responds to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio - and on the
country's ability to roll over its debt. Collard et al. (2016) introduce a new measure of government debt - maximum sustainable debt that considers
the fact that a shortfall in growth naturally increases the probability of default. They show that without sufficient institutional constraints, gov-
ernments will generally borrow up to a level close to the maximum that can be sustained. On this issue, see also Hamilton and Flavin (1986),
Kremers (1989), Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991), and Wilcox (1989)
3 In particular, Bohn (1998) refers to Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing model that considers an optimizing government that minimizes the cost of tax
collection by smoothing marginal tax rates over time. In his context, key features of the optimal policy are that tax rates should depend only on
permanent government spending and on the level of debt. Indeed, the tax-smoothing model yields an equation for the primary surplus, if one
subtracts noninterest government spending from tax revenues (all relative to GDP). The model implies that the non-debt determinants of the primary
surplus are the level of temporary government spending and a business cycle indicator, both taken by Barro (1986a, 1986b).
4 See Section 3.
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the equilibrium. In modeling the short term, given our choice to refer the relevant variables to potential output, crucially important is
the inclusion of a variable representing the output gap, which identifies and isolates the impact of cyclical factors not captured by the
potential GDP (that is the denominator of the structural equation). A pick-up in economic activity may, thus, be reversed, as activity
slows down, and should, therefore, not be seen as an underlying structural improvement. In the short run analysis, as a robustness
check, we also test whether the assumption considered in the tax-smoothing model affects the public primary surplus dynamics. We
show that, in the short run for all the different empirical specifications, the output gap coefficient is positive and statistically sig-
nificant suggesting that the structural primary balance always responds positively to transitory changes in GDP. Furthermore, the first
difference of public debt-to-GDP is shown to negatively and significantly affect the structural public primary balance-to potential GDP
in the short run. Finally, as a robustness test, we find that the primary surplus is significantly and negatively affected by the variables
considered in Barro analysis, i.e. GVAR and YVAR.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports a brief survey of the literature on the issues afforded. Section 3 develops the
model studying the relationship of government debt and primary surpluses as decomposed in structural and cyclical surpluses.
Section 4 is devoted to the empirical analysis for the 21 OECD countries and comments on the implications for the intertemporal
budget constraint in the long and the short term. Section 5 concludes.
2. Survey of the literature
Fiscal sustainability requires the government has to be able to repay its debt at some point in the future. The primary budget
balance is therefore a key determinant of government debt dynamics. The economic analysis has often tested fiscal sustainability of
debt policies through the use of nonstationary time series analysis. In this respect, the first approach by Hamilton and Flavin (1986)
focuses on the stochastic properties of the deficit inclusive of interest payments. Wilcox (1989), recalling that the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government requires that the present value of public debt asymptotically converges to zero, focuses on the
role of the interest rate to be resorted to in order to discount the stream of public debt.5 Trehan and Walsh (1991) suggested the
existence of a cointegration relationship between primary deficit and debt and the stationarity of the quasi-difference of the primary
deficit are sufficient and necessary conditions for sustainability: any time series that grows linearly converges to zero if it is ex-
ponentially discounted, provided the real interest rate is positive (on cointegration tests see also Trehan and Walsh, 1988; and
Ahmed and Rogers, 1995). More recently, Bohn (2007) showed that sustainability is compatible with any order of integration of the
variables involved.
A further different test on sustainability is that proposed by Bohn (1995, 1998). It states that, if the primary surplus-GDP ratio is a
positive function of the debt-GDP ratio, a given public debt policy can be shown to be sustainable. The plausible economic intuition is
that if governments run into debt today, they have to take corrective actions in the future by increasing the primary surplus in order
for public debt to be sustainable. From a statistical point of view, a rise in primary surpluses as a response to higher government debt
implies that the series of public debt relative to GDP become mean-reverting: because higher debt-GDP ratio leads to an increase in
the primary surplus relative to GDP, the debt-GDP ratio declines and returns to its mean. However, mean-reversion only holds if the
reaction coefficient, determining how strongly the primary surplus reacts as public debt rises, is sufficiently large. Bohn (1998) has
suggested that the analysis of the fiscal policy soundness should not be limited to the evaluation of stationarity of the debt-to-GDP
ratio and provides a new sustainability test that does not require interest rate assumptions. To determine whether governments react
to the evolution of debt by adjusting primary balances subsequently, the intuition is based on the use of fiscal policy reaction
functions for the assessment of fiscal deficit sustainability. As he poses the issue, the key requirement is that the primary surplus
increases at least linearly with debt/GDP at high debt-GDP ratios. This ensures that any upward movement in the debt-GDP ratio due
to negative shocks is eventually reversed through primary surpluses. The strength of this sustainability test is that it does not require
any assumptions about interest rates. It is valid in economies with uncertainty and risk aversion and for arbitrary debt management
policies, whether or not government bond rates are above or below the growth rate. Greiner and Fincke (2016) elaborate on that test
from a theoretical point of view, addressing the issues on whether (i) a sustainable debt policy is compatible with a rising debt to GDP
ratio, (ii) sustainability can be given if the government does not react to rising debt ratios, and (iii) there exists a critical initial debt
ratio that makes a sustainable debt policy impossible.
It is worth noticing that in the economic debate, the optimal degree of fiscal policy responsiveness to rising public debt and
changing macroeconomic conditions has also been subject to intense discussion and diverging views. In line with the literature on
fiscal reaction functions initiated by Bohn (1998), fiscal consolidation in case of a rapidly increasing public debt level has been seen
as a way to restore fiscal sustainability. Some authors, however, have considered the risks of dampening economic activity, and of
facing fiscal fatigue (Ghosh et al., 2013a, 2013b), especially when large and sustained fiscal consolidation appears to be required to
ensure sustainability (see Eichengreen and Panizza, 2016). The study of how fiscal reaction functions can be used in fiscal sus-
tainability analysis has recently received considerable attention. For example, Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa (2013, 2012), Medeiros
(2012), Burger et al. (2012), Celasun et al. (2006) present stochastic debt projections integrating behavioural equations. In recent
contributions, Fournier and Fall (2015), Ghosh et al., (2013a, 2013b) and European Commission (2011) have used fiscal reaction
functions for the estimation of public debt sustainability thresholds and public debt limits aimed at providing possible measures of
fiscal space. Finally, Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek (2017) also propose to use fiscal reaction functions to derive primary balance
5 In the same line a multivariate perspective on this issue also examines the long-run properties of the flows of expenditures and revenues: see,
among other others, Trehan and Walsh (1988), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Haug (1991) and Quintos (1995).
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benchmarks used to identify fiscal fatigue risks. Berti et al. (2016) contributes to the existing fiscal reaction function literature by
exploring if fiscal policy in EU Member States tend to react to a sufficient extent to increasing public debt or less supportive macro-
financial conditions to ensure fiscal sustainability.
A great attention has been put on how to model the nature of the relationship between the primary balance and public debt.
Initially specified as simple linear functions of debt, Lukkezen and Rojas-Romagosa, (2013, 2012), Celasun et al. (2006), Ghosh et al.
(2013a, 2013b), Medeiros (2012), Bohn (2005) estimated the reaction functions using non-linear specifications. Fournier and Fall
(2015), Legrenzi and Milas (2013), given the debt level dependent specifications, aim at capturing thresholds endogenously on the
basis of regime-switching models. Other approaches, for example, Burger et al. (2012) and Fincke and Greiner (2012, 2011) have
enabled time-varying debt coefficients using state-space modelling or penalized spline estimates. Checherita-Westphal and Ždarek
(2017), Baldi and Staehr (2016) and Weichenrieder and Zimmer (2015), also test whether fiscal responsiveness has changed over
time. Mauro et al. (2015) interact debt variables with macro-financial variables to determine if fiscal prudence/profligacy is influ-
enced by macroeconomic conditions and financial market pressure. Finally, European Commission (2011) and Camarero et al. (2015)
focus on the deficit-debt relationship, also called “the stock-flow adjustment,” which relates to all other factors that affect the
outstanding stock of debt but are not recorded as part of the primary balance.
3. The model
In order to setup our framework, the starting point of the present analysis is the relation between public debt, Dt, and public
primary balance, St, given by the accounting identity ++ +D D S R( )(1 )t t t t1 1 where Rt denotes the nominal interest rate. The
accounting identity can also be rewritten as follows: + ++ + +D D R S R(1 ) (1 ).t t t t t1 1 1 Notice here that the primary balance takes
on positive sign in case of surplus and negative sign in case of deficit. Thus, in case of deficit, the accounting identity means that debt
at time t+ 1 is equal to the sum, at time t, of debt, interest on debt, primary deficit and the interests on primary deficit. In case of
surplus, it means that debt at time t+ 1 is equal to the debt at time t plus interest on debt at time t minus the primary surplus of time t
minus the saved interests on primary surplus.6
We decompose St in a long-run component (the structural primary balance, S )ts and in a cyclical component (the non-structural
primary balance, +S S S S):tns t ts tns. Given this decomposition, then the debt law of motion can be rewritten as follows++ +D D S S R( )(1 )t t ts tns t1 1
In the presence of a growing economy with a non-zero growth rate, =µ Y Y/ 1t t t 1 , the evolution of the relation in terms of debt
to GDP ratio
+++ + +DY DY SY SY YY R(1 )tt tt tst tnst tt t11 1 1
that is
+++ + +DY DY SY SY YY R* (1 )tt tt t tst tnst tt t11 1 1
which can be rewritten as
+ +d d s s x( )t t t ts tns t1 1 (1)
where Y Y*/t t t denotes the output gap; Yt and Y *t denote the actual and potential GDP, respectively; Rt is the nominal interest rate;+ ++ + +x R µ(1 )/(1 )t t t1 1 1 denotes the ratio of the gross return on government debt to the gross growth rate of GDP and=+ + +d D Y/t t t1 1 1, =s S Y/ *ts ts t and =s S Y/tns tns t denote the debt-GDP ratio, structural primary balance on potential GDP and cyclical
primary balance-GDP ratio, respectively.
Given the derived public debt-to-GDP law of motion analytically described by Eq. (1), in order to shed some light on the public
debt time-series proprieties, and hence on public debt sustainability, a main assumption on the functional form of sts, i.e., the
structural public primary balance on potential GDP, must be considered.7 We borrow from Bohn (1998) and, in the light of the above
decomposition of the primary balance, we assume the following relation:+ = + + = +s s s d F d˜ ˜t t ts tns t t t t t1
6 This is the general accounting identity often used in the literature, for example it is used in Bohn (1998), because one cannot exclude a priori that
governments, also when promptly reacting to increases of public debt, are for whatever reason induced/obliged to run primary deficits. In case of
permanent primary surplus (when the whole series takes on positive sign), however, the accounting identity that considers the potential saving of
interests on surplus might be seen as quite odd. Indeed, in the literature we also find - for example Bohn (2007), Fincke and Greiner (2011, 2012)
and Grainer e Fincke (2016) – the reference to the accounting identity that exclude the potential saving of interest on primary balance, i.e.,++ +D D R S(1 )t t t t1 1 . The change of the reference accounting identity that consider this special case, however, does not change the results of the
model. The proof is available from authors upon request. Here, we prefer to stick to the most general form.
7 A large body of literature, among others Bohn (1998, 2005), Ghosh et al. (2013a), when studying the public debt sustainability rely on an
econometric model where a systematic relationship between the debt-GDP ratio, dt, and the primary balance, st, is considered.
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where ˜ denotes the “Bohn” response of primary surplus to the public debt, Ft represents the determinants of primary surplus-GDP
ratio, ɛt denotes the error term and = +Ft t t1 . In so doing, we have considered in the government reaction function of
(Bohn, 1998) the fundamental distinction between discretionary and automatic response of primary balance to fiscal policy, as
suggested by Gali et al. (2003). Both are referred to potential output, in order to identify the fiscal authority reaction and avoid
heteroscedasticity problems due to likely non-linearities of the fiscal policies as suggested by Giavazzi et al. (2000). In this context,
once a cointegrated panel approach, based on long run relationship, is implemented, the automatic or “passive” fiscal policy, re-
presented quantitatively by the nonstructural component of primary public balance, stns, should not be considered as a part of the
dependent variable. This is supported by the statistical propriety of the variable stns. In fact, the cyclical part of the primary balance is,
by construction and definition, stationary and results to be able to influence and determine only the short run dynamics. In a
cointegrated panel set-up, all the stationary and cyclical zero mean variables, which show only short-run dynamics, end up in the
residual term and hence do not influence the estimated coefficients responsible in identifying the long-run relationship between the
structural part of the government primary balance on potential GDP and debt on potential GDP. Thus, if debt and structural primary
balance are both non-stationary, then the cointegration regression of sts on d *t does not require to account for stns explicitly.
For these reasons, we concentrate on the existence of a systematic relation between debt to potential GDP ratio and structural
primary balance to potential GDP of the form= + + = +s d F d* * * * *ts t t t t t1 (2)
where =d D Y* / *t t t denotes the debt to potential output ratio, θ is the response of structural primary balance to public debt, F*t
represents the determinants of structural primary surplus-potential GDP ratio, *t denotes the error term and = +F* * *t t t1 .
In the light of Eq. (2), if both the government debt and structural primary balance to potential GDP results nonstationary and a
long-term relationship between them does exist, there is no need for an economic model to identify the stochastic process *t .
The consideration of a systematic relation between debt to potential GDP ratio and structural primary surplus or deficit of the
form described analytically by Eq. (2), yields a more detailed representation of the law of motion of public debt-to-GDP, represented
by Eq. (1) that can be rewritten with the aim of shedding some light on the (non)stationarity and hence on the public debt sus-
tainability. In the present theoretical setup, once the (estimated) structural primary surplus (deficit) to potential GDP, Eq. (2), is
replaced into Eq. (1), the latter can be rewritten as:=+ + +d x d x[1 (1 )]t t t t t1 1 1 (3)
where = + st t tns.8 Eq. (3) implies that the change in the debt-GDP ratio depends on the lagged level of debt-GDP ratio as from the
debt-GDP Eq. (1) and on both the determinants of primary balance-GDP ratio ηt plus stns. Thus, the key role for the (non)stationarity
and for the public debt sustainability is played by both the sign and the size of estimated response of structural primary balance to
public debt, θ, provided by the long-run relationship represented by Eq. (2). Given that +xt 1 results stationary,9 then the public debt-
GDP ratio results stationary if <x¯ (1 ) 1, where x¯ is the average value of + +x R µ(1 )/(1 )t t t . Therefore, the sign and the size of
the response of structural primary balance to the public debt, θ, turns out to be crucial for some conclusions on fiscal policy, in
general, and debt sustainability, in particular.
In the light of the above theoretical setup, i.e. in the presence of a fiscal authority reaction function, suggests what follows:
Proposition 1. Once the upper bound of the primary surplus to GDP ratio is not binding, a strictly positive reaction coefficient, θ>0,
guarantees sustainability of public debt. Furthermore, for > +R µ R( )/(1 ) the debt to GDP ratio converges to a constant, otherwise, i.e.,
for +R µ R( )/(1 ), it diverges to infinity as t→∞.10
Before moving to the empirical analysis testing for co-integration between cyclically adjusted primary balance and public debt, in
order to account for the country specific unobserved factors that cause a heterogeneous response to the common shocks, i.e., the issue
of cross-section dependence in the data, the setting of Eq. (2), must be modified as follows:= + + +s d f*its i it i it i it (4)
where, recall that d *it denotes the debt to potential output ratio, and= + + +d f g u*it i i it i it it (5)
where fit and git are unobserved factors affecting sits directly or indirectly (i.e., impacting on the set of variables d *it ); φi and ψi are the
country specific factor loads which cause a heterogeneous response to the common shocks, αi denotes the country intercept, uit
represents the white noise errors, = =i N and t T1, 2, .., 1, 2, .., denote the country and time indexes, respectively. The failure to
detect cross-section correlation and, thus, to take it into account when producing estimates will give rise the omitted variables
problems, thus causing bias in estimates and erroneous inference.
We will refer to as "long-run" empirical effects of public debt in the context of a stochastic autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
model where the "long-run" describes the equilibrium relationship (see Pesaran, 1997). If the variables in Eqs. (4) and (5) are I(1) and
cointegrated, the error term is an I(0) process for all i. The principal feature of cointegrated variables is their responsiveness to any
8 Recall that = =d D Y d* / * /t t t t t .
9 Further details on the stationarity test of +xt 1 are available upon request.
10 The proof of Proposition1 can be provided from authors upon request also for the case in which the reference accounting identity is++ +D D R S(1 )t t t t1 1 .
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deviation from the long-run equilibrium. This implies an error correction model, in which the short-term dynamics of the variables in
the system are influenced by the deviation from the equilibrium. In the light of the above considerations, we postulate the dynamic
panel specification as follows:= + + +s Z[ ]its i i i t i it it, 1
where ωi is the constant term, the term within the brackets are the residuals from Eq. (4), Φi is the error-correction speed of
adjustment parameter, it are white noise errors, Zit is a vector of stationary variables entering the dynamic specification, and δi are
the corresponding coefficients. In particular, we postulate the presence of short-term factors that affect its annual dynamics. Given
our interest on debt (non)stationarity, and given our empirical strategy dictated by the statistical proprieties of the variables involved
in the analysis, the consideration of a cointegration regression of sts on d *it permits us to overcome the potential problems related to
omitted variables and avoid to explicitly consider a theoretical model of fiscal policy, such as the already mention Barro's (1979) tax-
smoothing model used in Bohn (1998), Fincke and Greiner (2012), and Greiner et al. (2007). For this reason, our reference model,
both theoretically and empirically, will be represented by the long-run relation identified by cointegration regression between sits and
d *it (i.e. Eq. (4)), providing necessary and sufficient information for debt (non)stationarity, i.e. θ. At the same time, in order to shed
some light in the residual short run dynamics left by the long-run relationship, we consider an error correction model. In this respect,
the output gap can be considered as the main driver of the short-run dynamics. Indeed, the output gap identifies and isolates the
impact of cyclical factors not captured by the general government debt-to-potential GDP ratio. Short-term improvements in GDP
growth rate may be reversed, as activity slows down, and should, therefore, not be seen as an underlying structural improvement.
Finally, in order to account for the potential dynamic effects on the change of cyclically-adjusted general government primary
balances of the general government debt-to-GDP ratio the first difference of the latter variable is considered.
As a robustness check, however, for the short-run dynamics we shall also consider, as in Bohn (1998), the level of the temporary
government spending, GVAR, and a business cycle indicator, YVAR. Both variables GVAR and YVAR are taken from Barro (1986a,
1986b) and obtained for 21 OECD countries from 1991 to 2015.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the variables relevant for the analysis presented here. Data on the considered variables
are obtained from OECD sources. The 21 countries considered are Australia, Austria, Japan, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Korea, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK.
The panel spans the years from 1991 to 2015 with annual frequency. Notice here that the structural primary deficit or surplus would
be identified either by the cyclically adjusted or by the underlying primary balance. In our analysis, we refer to the OECD definition of
Cyclically-Adjusted General Government Primary Balances (OECD, 2018 p.14¸ see also Girouard and André, 2005) as obtained from the
underlying fiscal position when cyclical or automatic movements are removed from the fiscal components. Under fiscal policy, in fact,
this is the correct measure of the public finance stance, being given by the difference between government revenues and expenditures
corrected by the effects that could be attributed to the economic cycle and, thus, providing useful information to identify the
structural trends and to assess whether the fiscal policy of a country is expansionary, neutral or restrictive for a given period. Potential
GDP is identified by the output level associated to a constant inflation rate. Output Gap is defined as the deviations of actual GDP from
Potential GDP (OECD, 2016).
4. The empirical analysis for the 21 OECD countries
The first step in our analysis is to test whether the variables are nonstationary or not. Notice that the presence of cross-section
dependence within the framework of our dataset is highly likely. Developed economies tend to be hit by globally common shocks
even though they are affected in a heterogeneous manner, i.e., the impact varies according to their institutions and to their fiscal
framework.11 Here we investigate this issue by implementing the most commonly used test for cross section dependency
(Pesaran, 2004 and 2007) and the results of cross-section dependence test are reported in Table 2.
The above tests reject the null of lack of cross-section dependence. We thus proceed by testing for unit root and for the presence of
cointegration and finally estimating cointegrating relationships in the presence of cross section dependence.
We first test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross-section dependence (CADF), proposed by Pesaran (2007), which is
the homologous of Im et al. (2003) test. This test is based on the mean of individual DF (or ADF) t-statistics of each unit in the panel
Table 1
Summary statistics of the considered variables.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cyclically-adjusted general government primary balances 535 0.165 3.170 26.116 14.481
General government debt-to-GDP ratio 535 64.196 37.864 8.243 242.113
General government debt-to-potential GDP ratio 535 63.491 37.033 8.483 241.062
YVAR 535 0.332 2.330 12.010 12.996
GVAR 535 0.370 2.776 14.550 15.124
Output gap 535 1.007 0.027 0.9110 1.128
11 For a review of the panel time series literature, see Eberhardt and Teal (2011).
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and it assumes as the null hypothesis that all series are non-stationary.12 We consider also the statistics of a truncated version of CADF
statistics, which has finite first and second order moments. It allows to avoid size distortions, especially in the case of models with
residual serial correlations and linear trends (Pesaran, 2007). Given that the time series dimension, t, is fixed (and is not large enough
to rely on asymptotic properties), the test is applied to the deviations of the variable from initial cross-section mean assuring that the
CADF statistics do not depend on the nuisance parameters. Lags of the dependent variable are introduced with the aim at controlling
for serial correlation in the errors. All bandwidths and lag lengths are chosen according to 4(T/100)2/9 criterion. The number of lags
chosen according to the Akaike criterion is three. However, we have investigated results for several lags spanning from 1 to 6, with
the ensuing statistics Z[t-bar] follows a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Most of the
statistics, reported in Table 3 in grey, confirm the non-stationarity already found under the assumption of cross section independence.
This result prompts a test to confirm that the variables are cointegrated. To provide evidence in favor of the cointegration
hypothesis we apply the Westerlund (2007) (see also Persyn and Westerlund, 2008) tests on co-integration. These tests lift a re-
striction, embedded in previous tests for cointegration, requiring the long-term parameters for the variables in their levels to be equal
to the short-term parameters for the variables in their differences; when this restriction is not correct, it causes a significant loss of
power and the failure to reject the null of no cointegration.
Table 4 reports the outcome of four tests; in the first two cases the alternative hypothesis to the null is that the panel is
Table 2
Average correlation coefficients and Pesaran CD test.
Variables series tested CD-test P-value Corr. Abs. (Corr.)
Cyclically-adjusted general government primary balances 20.07 0.000 0.265 0.367
General government debt-to-GDP ratio 16.53 0.000 0.227 0.512
General government debt-to-potential GDP ratio 14.56 0.000 0.200 0.516
Notes: Pooled variables. Group variable: Country; Number of groups: 21. Test performed on 21 OECD countries. Under the null hypothesis of cross-
section independence CD ∼ N(0,1).
Table 3
Panel unit root tests, Pesaran (2007).
Notes: Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one region. The considered critical values are at 1%. CIPS – Cross-section
augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin test, CIPS* – Truncated Cross-section augmented Im-Pesaran-Shin test.
12 To eliminate the cross dependence, the standard DF (or ADF) regressions are augmented with the cross-section averages of lagged levels and
first-differences of the individual series.
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cointegrated, while the other two test the alternative that at least one unit is cointegrated. The values of the statistics suggest that we
can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level for both cases. These results strongly reject the hypothesis that the
series are not cointegrated at least in the case of constant only. Therefore, we further test for cross-sectional independence in the
residuals assuming the same dynamics. Based on 20 complete observations, the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence strongly
indicate the presence of common factors affecting the cross-sectional units. In the case of constant only the Breusch-Pagan LM test
provides = 435.202102 , =p 0.00. In the case of constant and trend the Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence gives = 374.432102 ,=p 0.00. We, therefore, bootstrap (1000 replications) robust critical values for the test statistics related to the Westerlund ECM panel
cointegration tests. The outcome in Table 5 shows that, when we account for cross-sectional dependencies, the tests reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration in both cases of constant only and constant and trend.
Based on this outcome we estimate the long-term coefficients by means of the augmented mean group estimator.13 Results are
reported in Table 6, where all coefficients represent averages across groups (countries) coefficient computed as outliers-robust
means.14
Table 4
Westerlund ECM panel co-integration tests on structural primary surplus/potential GDP and general government
debt-to-potential GDP ratio.
Constant
Statistic Value Z-value P-value
Gt −3.183 −7.170 0.000
Ga −12.483 −4.496 0.000
Pt −13.710 −7.117 0.000
Pa −12.624 −8.665 0.000
Constant and trend
Statistic Value Z-value P-value
Gt −3.522 −6.515 0.000
Ga −13.576 −1.054 0.146
Pt −17.821 −9.308 0.000
Pa −14.727 −4.331 0.000
Notes: Average AIC selected lag length: 0.9. Average AIC selected lead length: 0. Results with 21 series and 1
covariate for H0: no cointegration.
Table 5
Westerlund ECM panel cointegration tests on structural primary surplus/potential GDP and general government debt-to-potential GDP ratio.
Constant
Statistic Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value
Gt −3.183 −7.170 0.000 0.000
Ga −12.483 −4.496 0.000 0.000
Pt −13.710 −7.117 0.000 0.000
Pa −12.624 −8.665 0.000 0.000
Constant and Trend
Statistic Value Z-value P-value Robust P-value
Gt −3.595 −6.929 0.000 0.000
Ga −13.692 −1.132 0.129 0.005
Pt −17.821 −9.308 0.000 0.004
Pa −14.727 −4.331 0.000 0.006
Notes: Bootstrapped critical values (1000 replications). Results (with 21 series and 1 covariate) for H0: no cointegration.
13 The estimator chosen forms part of the panel time-series (or nonstationary panel) literature of second generation, which emphasizes variable
nonstationarity, cross-section dependence, and parameter heterogeneity (in the slope parameters, not just time-invariant effects). For discussion and
illustration of the application of panel time-series methods, see Eberhardt and Teal (2010, 2011) Eberhardt et al. (2013), and Moscone and
Tosetti (2010).
14 The objection might arise that the economies in the sample have their own legislation and, if some of them attains budget surpluses, it is
difficult to imagine that they have unsustainable time series of public debt. Indeed, when a panel estimate of the fiscal response is performed, the
advantage of relatively short time series has to be compared with the disadvantage that a single fiscal reaction rule is estimated over a panel of
countries giving rise to the relatively strong assumption of country-invariant fiscal behavior. However, in our analysis, as in Eberhardt and
Tail (2010) and Eberhardt et al. (2013), this assumption is in some dimensions relaxed by performing the Augmented Mean Group estimator which,
differently form the standard panel estimation, accounts for parameter heterogeneity in macro panel data and allows a group-specific coefficients
analysis. The full results from group-decomposition AMG estimation - available from authors upon request – actually show that the chosen estimator
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The results show a negative and significant impact of General Government debt/Potential GDP on the Structural Primary Surplus/
Potential GDP. In the long-run, an increase in the General Government debt-to-potential GDP reduces, by 0.058, the Structural
Primary Surplus/Potential GDP. As reported previously, it can be easily noted that the key role for the (non)stationarity and hence for
the public debt sustainability is played by the sign and size of estimated response of structural primary surplus to the public debt, θ,
provided by the long-run relationship represented by Eq. (4) and Proposition 1. Given that the gross interest rate on government debt
to gross growth rate of GDP, i.e. = + ++ + +x R µ(1 )/(1 )t t t1 1 1 , results stationary, the public debt - potential GDP ratio results stationary
if <x¯ (1 ) 1. For the 21 OECD economies considered in our empirical setup, the results suggest that, with θ<0, the debt-to-GDP
results nonstationary and not sustainable in the long term.
In other words, given that +xt 1 results stationary, the public debt-GDP ratio results stationary if <x¯ (1 ) 1, and given the (non)
stationarity condition, the sign and the size of the response of structural primary surplus to the public debt, θ results to be crucial for
debt sustainability. A quick investigation on the dataset of 21 OECD countries, for the 1991–2015 sample, suggests that the interest
rate on government debt is =R¯ 5.15% while the average GDP growth rate is =µ¯ 2.24% yielding an average gross interest rate on
government debt, + R1 ¯, to GDP-growth rate, + µ1 ¯ , ratio of = + + =x R µ¯ 1 ¯/1 ¯ 1.03. In the light of this evidence, given that the
average interest rate on government debt results greater than the normalized, by (1 ), sum of average growth rate of GDP, µ¯, and
the estimated response of structural primary surplus to the public debt, θ, i.e. > +R µ¯ ( ¯ )/(1 ), unlike what suggested by
Bohn (1998) for the US fiscal policy and by Westerlund and Prohl (2010) for rich OECD economies, not only the sign but also the size
of the response of structural primary surplus to the public debt is the main determinant of public debt (non)sustainability in the case
of 21 OECD countries, for the 1991–2015.
We now turn to the short-run error correction term representation. We perform a Mean Group Regression for 21 OECD countries
onto which we impose the long-run specification estimated in Table 6.15 The results are reported in Table 7.
For the sake of completeness, and as a robustness test, Table 7 reports, in the different columns, six different specifications for the
error correction representation by the Mean Group Regression, characterizing the short-run estimation model. More precisely, the
first difference of debt to potential GDP ratio, the output gap and the constant term accompany all the regressions carried out in our
analysis; the first group of models, i.e. [1] to [3], differs from the second one, i.e. [4] to [6], because it does not account for the
presence of the trend, which we use as control. Within each group of models, different specifications are considered. More specifi-
cally, [1] and [4] constitute the baseline estimation model, without and with trend, respectively. In columns [2], [5] and [3], [6] we
account for the presence of GVAR and YVAR, respectively.
As expected, in all the reported regressions, the estimated cointegrating vector (i.e. the EC term) is negative and statistically
significant. However, in the presence of a disequilibrium, the speed of convergence, represented by the parameter EC, to the long-run
equilibrium relationship, represented by Z, is higher in the presence of the trend as compared to the regressions performed in the
absence of the trend, implying relatively contained different short-term dynamics. Moreover, in the short-run, for all the different
empirical specifications, the output gap produces a positive and statistically significant response. The positive output gap estimated
coefficients suggest that the structural primary balance always responds positively to transitory changes in GDP. Also, the first
difference of public debt-to-GDP is shown to negatively and significantly affect the structural public primary balance-to potential
GDP. Finally, as a robustness test, we find that the primary surplus is significantly and negatively affected by the variables considered
in Barro analysis, i.e. GVAR and YVAR. That is, both the temporary government spending component, GVAR, and the temporary
component of output, YVAR, negatively and significantly affect the first difference debt to potential GDP ratio.
5. Conclusions
At the middle-end of the great recession, fiscal rules of budget balance over the cycle have been introduced, more or less in-
tensively in different countries, to counteract the debt accumulation. Thus, a natural question arises: Have the fiscal policy of
different OECD economies been sustainable in both the long and the short terms? To answer this question, we have disentangled
Table 6
Augmented mean group estimator. dependent variable: structural primary surplus/potential GDP.
Coefficient Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval
General Government debt-to-potential GDP ratio ***0. 058 0.018 0.093 0.023
Common Dynamic Process (c.d.p.) 1.020*⁎* 0.197 0.633 1.407
Time trend 0.110*** 0.0414 0.0289 0.1912
Constant 0.758 1.757 −2.685 4.202
Nr. of Observations 539
Nr. of Groups 21
(footnote continued)
is able to capture the different peculiarity of the countries considered individually. In this respect, it would be also interesting to compare our results
with the results of individual countries using a time varying parameter approach. We have also carried out the individual fiscal response using the
time varying Kalman filter. These results are available upon request.
15We impose a long-run specification = + +Z c d p trend debt potential GDP0.758 1.02 . . . 0.110 0.058 / , estimated previously in Table 6.
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discretionary from automatic response of primary deficit to government actions. The former are captured quantitatively by the
structural component of primary public surplus, which is not influenced by the economic cycle. The latter are captured by the
nonstructural component of primary public surplus. In order to avoid heteroscedasticity problems due to likely non-linearities of the
fiscal policies, we have also referred our variables to potential output. Finally, in order to consider the heterogeneous responses to the
common shocks by part of the governments of the country involved, we allow for cross-section dependence in the data.
Showing that public debt-GDP ratio and structural primary surplus are cointegrated, we found a sort of general empirical law of
policy behavior valid for the OECD countries according to which, on the one side, the long-term governments’ reaction to the
accumulation of debt in terms of sustainability is negative, i.e., the fiscal policies are not sustainable. On the other side, in the short
term, an asymmetric fiscal policy response, exploiting the output gap, by part of the political class of the countries considered seems
to emerge: it intervenes with a new deficit and debt when the output gap is positive, but it does not adopt a symmetrical correction
when the situation is reversed. These results may be taken as evidence that the politicians in power, at least in most OECD countries
considered, have a shorts-sighted perspective. A reason is often being found in the politicians’ need to be re-elected. New research
may prove to be useful to ascertain whether the empirical law found also implies that the electors – who matter for the political class
to be re-elected – have, in turn, a short sight view because of a myopic discount of the future. Alternatively, possibly, high transaction
and information costs of the agency relations of the electors with the politicians, in the budgetary matters, allow an opportunistic
behavior of the agents.
In any case, the results of our research may help in focusing on asymmetrical long-sighted monetary and fiscal policies, working in
reverse, to counteract the short sighted asymmetric policies of the politicians made possible by the present rules and behaviors of
fiscal and monetary policies. In this respect, Buchanan (1958, 1966) maintains that public debt, properly defined, is a burden on the
future generations because it shifts to them the onus of covering with fresh resources a debt made in the present, for which there are
not present resources. To the objection that, in the case of an unutilized economic capacity, resources to cover the public debt are
available in the present, Buchanan argues that this public debt is not a true public debt, as an issuance of money could (and should)
replace it.
At that time, the non-conventional monetary policies of the central Banks were not available. Now, however, these same argu-
ments may give a theoretical foundation to the policy of the Central Banks, in periods of positive output gap, consisting in purchasing
on the secondary market public debt issued in the past to expand the quantity of money available on the market to finance public
investments. This stock of public debts enters in the portfolio of the Central Bank, which shall put it back on the market in period of
negative output gap to reduce the quantity of money available for new public debts and/or renewal of the old one. By this long-run
monetary-fiscal policy one may displace the short sighted asymmetrical fiscal policy that prevails in the OECD countries, which one
can deduce from the cointegration between structural primary surplus and public debt /GDP ratio.
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